The Dissoi logoi on sortition

Dissoi logoi, a Greek book usually dated to the end of the 5th century BC, has the following argument about sortition, whose first part is quite similar in both content and form to the argument attributed to Socrates by Xenophon in Memorabilia. The second part is reminiscent of the argument made by Isocrates in Areopagiticus.

VII. [No Title]
(1) Some of the popular orators say that offices should be assigned by lot, but their opinion is not the best. (2) Suppose someone should question the man who says this as follows: Why don’t you assign your household slaves their tasks by lot, so that if the teamster drew the office of cook, he would do the cooking and the cook would drive the team, and so with the rest ? (3) And why don’t we get together the smiths and cobblers, and the carpenters and goldsmiths, and have them draw lots, and force each one to engage in whatever trade he happens to draw and not the one he understands ? (4) The same thing could also be done in musical contests: have the contestants draw lots and have each one compete in the contest he draws; thus the flute-player will play the lyre if that falls to his lot, and the lyre-player the flute. And in battle it may turn out that archers and hoplites will ride horseback and the cavalry-man will use the bow, with the result that everyone will do what he does not understand and is incapable of doing. (5) And they say that this procedure is also not only good but exceptionally democratic, whereas I think that democratic is the last thing it is. Because there are in cities men hostile to the demos, and if the lot falls to them, they will destroy the demos. (6) But the demos itself ought to keep its eyes open and elect all those who are well-disposed towards it, and ought to choose suitable people to be in command of the army and others to be the law-officers, and so on.

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31 Responses

  1. We have a fairly clean version of it at http://www.constitution.org/gr/dissoi_logoi.html

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  2. >Some of the popular orators say that offices should be assigned by lot, but their opinion is not the best.

    This argument, while self-evidently true, has no bearing on the case for allotted juries, the true legacy of Athenian political practice. Competence is clearly the key factor in assigning individual offices, whereas the role of the jury is to deliver a considered judgment that represents that of the whole political community.

    >And they say that this procedure is also not only good but exceptionally democratic, whereas I think that democratic is the last thing it is.

    There is nothing inherently democratic about assigning individual offices by lot, unless the community is so small that all citizens might rule and be ruled in turn. Fifth-century Athens was already too large for this to apply.

    >there are in cities men hostile to the demos, and if the lot falls to them, they will destroy the demos.

    This is another good reason why sortition should be for representative juries, not for individual office holders and that the sortive mandate should only apply to aggregate functions such as voting.

    >the demos itself ought to keep its eyes open and elect all those who are well-disposed towards it.

    That’s why democracy requires a mixture of sortition and election.

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  3. Trust a clever-dick Greek philosopher to set up a straw-man argument! Of course the lottery selection would be among the qualified ‘slaves’ only. And I sure we can all think of may good reasons for ‘job-rotation’ via the lot?

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  4. Conall,

    The allotment process in Athenian democracy involved no relevant a priori qualifications, so the author’s objections are entirely salient. Although there are many good reasons for job rotation, it does not lead to the selection of the most competent and can only be described as democratic in tiny societies that have a disproportionate number of political offices to fill (and slave-owning citizens with the necessary free time to devote to playing musical chairs). The arguments for job-rotation are to do with equitable resource distribution and anti-factionalism/corruption, not democracy or good governance.

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  5. Once again, the solution is straightforward: a multistage selection process in which sortition alternates with filtering for ability and virtue. Such a process, if designed and conducted well, can be expected to select the wisest and most competent persons for any job that are not eager for the job and not under the undue influence of special interests. The Venetian model is instructive for this.

    Rather than always returning to simple but poorly designed models, let’s move on to models that might work, even if they might be rather complicated.

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  6. I agree that complexity is unavoidable. Assuming your multistage process refers to the selection of political executives, do you agree that there is an independent (judgment) role for large political juries, and that this is not amenable to anything more than a minimal filter?

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  7. Since there is no absolute measure of wisdom, virtue, competence, ability, etc. when it comes to political decisions (what direction should society go), it makes no sense to apply any filters. And even if a case could be made that certain people were better at making decisions individually, that does not translate to groups as a whole. Also the filter makers would begin a slippery slope problem, (who will guard the guardians) and become the de facto deciders.

    In a group of over a dozen or so, adding diversity (both cognitive style, class, sex, life-experience, etc.) is more beneficial to good decision making than having a homogeneous group of “the best.” Allowing a few genuinely incompetent people into a decision-making group will not harm the quality of the product, and may provide some key piece of vital information that would improve the decision.

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  8. There are many ways to structure a multi-stage selection process. So an election panel might be limited to choosing from among themselves, or from among a sorted pool of a parallel track, or from a larger pool such as the general population. It also makes a difference whether the final stage is sortition or election.

    So to get the best executive the final stage might be election by a sorted panel, perhaps anonymous, of a candidate from the general population. That is similar to what the U.S. Electoral College is set up to do in selecting the President, and there is no reason why states could not select electors by a sortition process.

    In a novel I am working on I have the characters adopt such a process in which the final stage alternates between election and sortition, starting with election, so the chief executive cannot succeed himself (except in the unlikely event he merges as the sorted one). The first selection uses election in the final round, and selects the leader of the movement that adopted the new constitution. But for subsequent elections everyone would have an incentive to elevate persons for merit selection pools where jury panels are able to draw from a larger population than the ones from the last sortition. The result would be a kind of aristocracy of talent and virtue but selected with the informed consent of random samples of the general population, each sample ever more talented and virtuous, while remaining as representative as the more talented and virtuous can be.

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  9. The Socratic argument is self-contradictory (as pointed out in the past here on more than one occasion).

    The argument assumes that it is evident to all that certain people are better at governing than others. If this is the case then the allotted chamber would simply turn to those with superior skill, ask for their advice and follow it.

    The fact that Socrates is concerned that the allotted would not follow the advice of those he considers experts shows that the situation is quite different: Socrates would like to see the state controlled by a certain set of people whom he considers best qualified, while the majority in the population does not consider those same people as being best qualified and prefer to follow the advice of others or to make their own policy.

    The problem is therefore not of putting universally acknowledged experts in power, but rather a matter of differences of opinion about who is best qualified.

    So Socrates was either uncritically repeating conventional oligarchical wisdom or else he was being deliberately manipulative. Either way, offering this argument does not enhance his reputation.

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  10. Constitutionalism,

    I agree that a multi-step process that includes sortition and election is ideal for selecting an executive. It is slecting members for the legislative function where I think simple sortition is superior.

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  11. I agree with Terry — both Jon and Yoram are conflating the selection of political executives and policy jurists. The role of sortition in the former is prophylactic (to minimise the risk of corruption), whereas in the latter it is to generate a statistically-representative microcosm. These are two entirely different functions for sortition — the former positive and the latter negative — and they need to be kept separate (Peter Stone’s book unfortunately subsumes the latter under the former). There might even be a case for two different terms rather than a single one (sortition), as the two functions have nothing whatsoever in common. For example a representative body constituted by sortition would be extremely easy to corrupt ex post if it performed anything other than aggregate functions (ie voting in secret).

    If the 4th century Athenians distinguished between political officials and policy juries, adopting rotation for the former and (proto-representational) sortition for the latter, then I think we should also respect this distinction. My suggestion for a minimal filter for the latter was simply to ensure that all jurists understood what was being talked about, but (reluctantly) agree with Terry that this is a slippery slope and that a large jury can tolerate a small number of incompetents.

    I would also have thought that, given Jon’s reverence for the Founders, he would have respected the distinction between executive and legislative functions, so would appeal to him to answer directly my original question:

    >do you agree that there is an independent (judgment) role for large political juries, and that this is not amenable to anything other than a minimal filter?

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  12. As Yoram Gat says, the Dissoi logoi text includes two different arguments, the Socratic one and the Isocratic one.
    *** The « Socratic » argument about competence has no great value. Sure, « technical » jobs are not to be assigned by pure sortition. And in Athens the technical fonctions, military and financial, were assigned by election. Actually, to have value, the « Socratic argument » must imply that it exists a « general political competence » which can be evaluated objectively, as can be a specific technical competence – which nobody ever demonstrated. Terry Bouricius observations (April 01) destroy convincingly the Socratic argument.
    *** The « Isocratic » argument against sortition – that the lot may give power to men hostile to democracy – has likewise no great value.
    *** First in the Second Athenian Democracy – in the time of Isocrates himself – alloted juries had great power (legislative juries, and judiciary juries, including « judicial review » of decrees and laws), but these juries were so huge, hundreds of jurors, that even with the worst lack of luck the probability of a take over by the tiny anti-democratic minority was no worth of serious consideration. We could say that maybe Isocrates was of good faith, considering the lack of statistical thought in Ancient Greece. But the idea of the « protective effect of huge numbers » is intuitive enough, and is present for instance in Lysias 26, On the scrutiny of Evandros, §11.
    *** The « Isocratic argument » seems to have more weight regarding the executive colleges with small size, or the archons. But Isocrates « forgets » the procedure of « dokimasia », which was intended precisely to exclude people of dubious civic behaviour or dubious democratic propensities. Before being given a political function, anybody chosen by lot (or, actually, by election) could be subject to a scrutiny. Four works of Lysias are about such scrutinies – discourse 16 and (probably) 25 are defences, discourse 26 and 31 are attacks.
    *** The Isocrates rejection of lot was actually only an element of a coherent political thought, expounded more or less ingenuously in the Areopagiticus. Isocrates accepts the enfranchisement of all citizens, and therefore thinks he can say himself « democrat ». But he rejects sortition, knowing very well that election will give dominance in actual power to the social elites (Areopagiticus §26 : « those citizens who could afford the time and possessed sufficient means should devote themselves to the care of the commonwealth, as servants of the people » – transl. Georges Norlin); and the Areopagus, made in this perspective from former elected magistrates of « good » social status, will have the « censorial » role of contemporary judicial and mediatic elites. Actually, we can consider Isocrates as a precursor of the modern political model which covers the reality of our contemporary polyarchies.

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  13. Andre

    I think we are all persuaded that large political juries are not victims of either the Socratic or the Isocratic objection, but please would someone outline the democratic argument for using sortition to appoint political executives in large modern states. Given that it cannot be rotation (rule and be ruled in turn) why would we want to even consider appointing political executives by lot? I can see that the mechanism is clearly impartial but what are its democratic merits? All we seem to be going on is Montesquieu’s citation of Aristotle’s general claim regarding the nature of election and sortition, but this was clearly a reference to rotation in small political communities. It makes no sense to refer to a randomly-selected individual magistrate as a representative. So why would we even want to consider filling political offices by sortition?

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  14. I’m not conflating. I’m urging multistage procedures for filling all kinds of offices, legislative, executive, and judicial. But somewhat different procedures for each.

    As for using only a simple, one-step sortition process for legislators, with minimal filtering, I disagree that ordinary people have the backgrounds of knowledge and ability to make policy judgments, relying on the advice of experts. I have spent more than two years working with members of Congress, and more time with state legislators, and that might almost work with the latter, but not with the former. The decisions that must be made by Congress are vastly more complicated and subtle than those that state legislatures confront.

    One of the greatest problems with Congress is that almost none of its members have enough domain knowledge to make the decisions they must make. Their only expertise is in how to win elections. They don’t even have enough domain knowledge to know who the real experts are, or the wisdom to care to know. Yet contrary to what some might think, they are all too representative of the people who elected them. I would expect a random selection of ordinary citizens to have the same problem.

    There were many times when I was the only person in the room who understood the issues, and that was appreciated by a few of the staffers, but their bosses never cared to ask me for insight. I didn’t control a lot of money or votes, so they didn’t care what I or anyone else with expertise might have to say, that could not help them get re-elected. Policy reality wasn’t real to them, and I find that for most ordinary people.

    Now part of the problem is that they were driven to seek re-election. One of the benefits of sortition I foresee is that it would relieve them of that pressure, and hopefully allow them more time and attention to that policy reality, but they would still need to know enough to know who the experts are, when the field is flooded with myriads of claimants to expertise of uncertain credentials and all disagreeing with one another.

    One of the main ways lobbyists gain influence is by their policy expertise, which is especially influential when it is not part of the agenda of the lobbyist’s clients, but offered as a way to get access to influence members on such client agendas. But even then access is only granted to those with money or votes.

    If there was legislation that could divert a extinction-level asteroid impact, members wouldn’t listen to anyone telling them about it who doesn’t have political clout. And neither would most ordinary citizens.

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  15. Constitutionalism wrote: “If there was legislation that could divert a extinction-level asteroid impact, members wouldn’t listen to anyone telling them about it who doesn’t have political clout. And neither would most ordinary citizens.”

    While this may be a bit hyperbolic, I think this story distills the essence of elected legislator behavior. But you then assert, without any basis, that ordinary citizens with no election imperative would behave the same. Why would they? Wouldn’t they have a powerful incentive to use expert professional staff to evaluate experts with knowledge about the crisis, with NO incentive to do anything other than this?

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  16. Keith wrote: “So why would we even want to consider filling political offices by sortition?”

    Nobody on this Blog has advocated selecting a one-person (or small) political office such as a chief executive solely by lot. However, as in the Italian City Republics (and Constitutionalism’s model) there is a powerful NEGATIVE, or anti-corruption value in incorporating lot as PART of the process for selecting a chief executive. A sortition body might hire an executive, or nominated individuals might be evaluated for competence, and a final candidate selected by lot from an approved pool, or some other mixture of lot and election (though not as complicated as that of Venice).

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  17. Jon,

    I’m glad you agree that randomly-selected legislators would be as ignorant as their elected counterparts. This is why my proposal makes a distinction between knowledgeable advocates (including lobbyists) and lay judges. I agree that randomly-selected persons would be as ignorant as elected members when it comes to selecting knowledgeable advocates; that’s why I argue that they should be independently selected, as in the Deliberative Poll. Madison calls for a separation between advocates and judges in Federalist 10 (or at least argues that combining both roles in a single body of men will lead to corruption).

    Terry,

    Actually Yoram has suggested filling all political offices randomly. I agree that sortition can have a prophylactic role in the selection of officeholders, but this negative function should not be conflated with the positive argument for descriptive representation, as is the case with Peter Stone’s book.

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  18. > Actually Yoram has suggested filling all political offices randomly.

    Actually, Terry has it right while Keith, as usual, is extremely careless with the facts. I really don’t why anybody still bothers engaging with Keith given his obvious disregard for either facts or logic.

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  19. Delighted to hear that Yoram has modified his views, and is now prepared to acknowledge that expertise is an independent variable.

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  20. Sutherland’s response above may seem absurdly idiotic or manipulative. Unfortunately, however, it is quite typical of Sutherland’s writing. I advise anyone reading this and considering engaging with Sutherland to keep this in mind.

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  21. I did a quick trawl of the blog archive to find evidence that Yoram had argued in the past for the use of sortition to fill individual executive offices and in the process was pleased to find that I’m not the only one to be dismissed as idiotic/manipulative/careless with the facts/logic etc:

    “Doctrines such as Nozick’s are so absurd and without merit as to hardly deserve discussion.”

    “If this is true, then Hayek was a fool.” [if it isn’t true then John Burnheim must have been “careless with the facts”]

    https://equalitybylot.wordpress.com/2011/06/30/john-burnheim-to-reason-why/

    I’m glad to be dissed in such eminent company. The normal scholarly convention is to disagree, rather than dismiss, especially when one’s intellectual opponent is on the opposite end of the political divide. This is particularly good advice when commenting in an area outside one’s own scholarly speciality.

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  22. Let’s keep disagreements civil and impersonal. We’re not competing to win any elections here.

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  23. *** We must not be misled by the « executive » / « legislative » duality, which carries thoughts from a foregone World, mainly static. In the dynamic modern World, the sovereign dêmos in a dêmokratia would have the last word in deciding about policies, this is the basic point. Laws – excepting « constitutional » laws – are general rules designed to implement the chosen policy, executive networks are to enforce this policy. For instance the dêmos would have to choose the energy policy first, as a sufficiently detailed option – the « legislative » and « executive » functions are « secundary ».
    *** The policies need administrative networks, led by managers, who clearly must have some expertise in the field, and should logically been chosen among the Statespersons who advocated the chosen policy. Here if sortition has a role, it would be rather small. In Athens the « managers » were only in the military and financial fields, and they were elected, without sortition (not without « dokimasia »). We can imagine in a future dêmokratia some use of lot among selected candidates, as suggests Terry Bouricius (April 2, 2 :47), but election would remain the main step.
    *** But sortition could be used on a higher scale in other areas. As I said in an earlier post, the dêmokratia would need a control of the administrative networks, under the same standards of « quality assurance » which allow to control the functioning of systems in private business. That needs auditors, and at least a part of the auditing teams could be filled with ordinary citizens after some training (quality assurance is not quantum physics). This would be useful to prevent the risk of corruption and especially of class or professional connivance, even unconscious one. Overseeing by ordinary citizens (therefore through sortition) would be as well necessary in specifically sensitive spots.
    *** Many « executive » decisions concerning individuals in our polycracies should be actually considered as « judicial » – as for instance when a refugee asks for immigration, and the last word should be given by « citizen juries ».
    *** We must beware that a model of modern dêmokratia which would give to citizen juries the legislative power of contemporary parliamentary bodies, all other « branches » functioning as now, would be a sham. But we could think that the fact would appear clearly to a legislative citizen jury, and that general democratization would follow a democratic control of the legislative branch. At least if the last word in constitutional judicial review is as well given to the dêmos through a citizen jury.

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  24. Thanks for the clarification Andre, the distinction between policy choice and legislation is an interesting one. We’re all agreed that the latter should be subject to the approval of a citizen jury, and I’ve proposed earlier that alternative democratic mechanisms (election and/or votation) would be more appropriate for the former.

    But why should government executives be chosen from among the statespersons who advocated the chosen policy? Given that we agree that managerial expertise is the desideratum, why would we want to recruit partisans to this role?

    Your notion of auditors selected by sortition is quite close to a proposal made by Oliver Dowlen at the last sortition workshop in London, so should receive widespread support. I imagine that most people would also approve of the notion of juries for all (or at least most) quasi-executive decisions on the application of the law to individuals.

    I don’t agree that all the other branches would be a sham. For the sake of continuity — both between government departments and over time (‘joined up government’ in modern parlance), executive ministers would have to have genuine power and a reasonable degree of security of tenure. And there would need to be binding fiscal rules in order to avoid bankruptcy (balanced budgets over the economic cycle). I’m aware that these are anti-democratic interventions, but then I believe in mixed government rather than pure democracy — a system of government designed for angels rather than men, in the words of one of your own countrymen.

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  25. *** Keith says « why should government executives be chosen from among the statespersons who advocated the chosen policy? Given that we agree that managerial expertise is the desideratum, why would we want to recruit partisans to this role? »
    *** First, strong sensitivities can be acting. If I look for contraception or abortion, I would prefer the process to be managed by an expert – but not an expert who, for religious or philosophical reasons, are strongly against the process itself …. Let’s consider a dêmos who accepts a wide amount of immigration, especially for refugees or steteless persons, but nevertheless does not accept a policy of total openness. I think it would be a strange idea to take as manager of the immigration agency a statesperson who considers that going to the country of his choice is a basic right of every human being…
    *** Furthermore, if some statespersons advocate a choice, and it turns wrong, it would be too easy to say that the policy was managed by an opponent who, even unconciously, sabotaged the process.

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  26. *** Keith says « For the sake of continuity, ministers would have to have genuine power and a reasonable degree of security of tenure. And there would need to be binding fiscal rules in order to avoid bankruptcy (balanced budgets over the economic cycle). I’m aware that these are anti-democratic interventions but then I believe in mixed government rather than pure democracy — a system of government designed for angels rather than men, in the words of one of your own countrymen. »
    *** I agree with Keith practical proposals. But I don’t consider them as « anti-democratic ». Ministers must be strictly audited, but they must have genuine power – actually, if you don’t give genuine power to a manager, auditing him is nonsense. A « constitutional » law about fiscal rules, protected by a constitutional citizen jury, is not anti-democratic – we must follow here the Second Athenian Democracy, not the First.
    *** Rousseau used the word « democracy » in a very restrictive meaning : a system where the General Assembly of the dêmos would concentrate all the basic powers – i-e the First Athenian Democracy model. Rousseau (and even Montesquieu) had no good knowledge of the difference between the two Athenian models, and of the importance of citizen juries in 4th century Athens. These facts were overlooked by the philosophical tradition (Aristotle does not mention anywhere the legislative juries for instance, and neglects the judicial juries as « guardians of the law ») ; and the literary tradition concentrated on the « Age of Pericles ».
    *** The restricted use of the word « democracy » by Rousseau is confusing, therefore unhappy, and must be avoided. General vote and citizen juries are two democratic devices, and the balance between them is a practical choice.
    *** Post Scriptum : I am French, and Rousseau would not have been happy to be considered as a Frenchman. Therefore please, Keith, don’t call me as a countryman of Jean-Jacques !

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  27. Andre

    In the UK we have a long tradition of a dispassionate civil service, there to enact the political will of the legislature. Perhaps this was always rather fanciful — it certainly represents a conservative restraint by the mandarins on the implementation of the popular will, but I’m inclined to view this as a valuable check/balance and better than the implementation of partisan policies by fellow-partisans. Change will be a little bit slower, but there’s a better chance of getting it right — particularly if departmental tenure is somewhat longer than with existing political ministers and senior civil servants moving around between department.

    >I agree with Keith practical proposals. But I don’t consider them as « anti-democratic.

    I guess I meant anti-democratic in the sense of the rule of law, rather than the rule of men, the motif of the second demokratia. Intrigued to hear that Aristotle did not mention the political juries, I didn’t realise that. This provides support for Kinch Hoekstra’s theory that Aristotle’s criticisms of radical democracy were aimed at the late 5th century. But why didn’t he mention something that was right in front of his nose, especially given the fate of Socrates at the hands of a jury?

    My understanding of the Social Contract by that well-known Citizen of Geneva (oops!) was that his references to democracy were to the selection of government officers by rotation.

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  28. I lean with Keith, preferring impartial professional administrators periodically evaluated by an allotted citizen panel. Just as an opponent of a policy might sabotage its execution, an ADVOCATE of a policy might pursue it for too long, not acknowledging some fatal flaw. Like many city managers in the U.S. I prefer that public policy decided democratically by juries be implemented by career professionals who are accountable to juries.

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  29. I have some doubts about the use of « impartial professional administrators » as advocated by Keith Sutherland and Terry Bouricius, not as standard public servants, but as managers with « genuine power ». But I acknowledge the argument about the « long tradition of a dispassionate civil service » in Britain. Clearly, we must distinguish in our discussions between which would be valid for any dêmokratia in a modern society, and details which may depend of the local tradition and the local state of minds.

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  30. *** Keith said : « Intrigued to hear that Aristotle did not mention the political juries, I didn’t realise that. This provides support for Kinch Hoekstra’s theory that Aristotle’s criticisms of radical democracy were aimed at the late 5th century. But why didn’t he mention something that was right in front of his nose, especially given the fate of Socrates at the hands of a jury? »
    *** I did not say that Aristotle did not know about political use of criminal juries, as trials of statespersons (or of Socrates, a very exceptional event) under good or false incriminations.
    *** I say first that Aristotle doesn’t ever mention legislative juries ; we know « nomothetai » and their functioning only by study of political speeches (Demosthenes, Aeschines).
    *** I say secondly that Aristotle does not seriously consider the legality and constitutionality control, in the Second Athenian Democracy, through judicial juries. Aristotle knows the « graphê para nomon » (he even quotes it when mentioning the debate about the legitimacy of slavery – cf Politics, I, 6,1 – 1255a) but he appears not taking it seriously as enforcing the « rule of law » ; he seems to consider it basically only as a way of fight between politicians – which it was, sure, but it had as well a systemic role.
    *** These two bias were effective to give a wrong idea to the Western intellectual tradition and to prevent a good understanding of the Second Athenian Democratic model – together with the fascination for the Age of Pericles.
    *** Were « Aristotle’s criticisms of radical democracy aimed at the late 5th century »? I think rather that Aristotle disliked strongly dêmokratia in principle, by elitist fear and contempt of the ordinary people. But as he wanted to keep the arguments of the oligarchical tradition against dêmokratia, a regime « submitted to the whims of the dêmos flattered by the dêmagogoi », he chose to overlook the changes in the Athenian system.
    *** And, actually, to do it more easily, Aristotle, usually does not qualify the contemporary Athenian regime. Everywhere in the « Politics » we find the word of « extreme democracy » but where this extreme stage did occur ? Was contemporary Athens an « extreme democracy » ? Usually we are given no idea… When there is a hint, we find that « extreme democracy » is the system where all citizens rule (« to pantas koinônein » Politics, VI, 4, 15 ; 1319b4) and where members of juries, taken through lottery, get some allowance (Politics, II, 12, 3- 4 ; 1274a) – ie the Athenian system without distinction between the times of Pericles and Demosthenes.

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  31. Interesting bleg: Canadian Senators Selected by Random Selection http://kejamo.wordpress.com/2014/04/10/canadian-senators-selected-by-random-selection/

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